The Spectator: 'Parliament needs protecting from foreign infiltration', Benedict Rogers

The suggestion this weekend that an alleged Chinese spy is a British-born parliamentary researcher – leading a policy group aimed at countering the growing threat from Beijing – has sent shockwaves through Westminster and beyond. The individual denies the accusations and says he is ‘completely innocent’ but MPs who know him and many of us who interacted with him are obviously concerned. 

The investigation into the alleged spy is still ongoing, but regardless of the police’s findings Xi Jinping’s regime has long been running a campaign to influence, infiltrate and intimidate people abroad, with the aim of silencing critics and subverting democracy.  These concerns have gained particular prominence in the UK. Last year, MI5 sounded the alarm about the apparent threat from Beijing’s agents in Westminster – when it alleged that a UK-based lawyer Christine Lee was involved in ‘political interference activities’ (Lee strongly denies wrongdoing and is suing the MI5 over the allegations.) Earlier this summer parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee warned that China has penetrated ‘every sector’ of the UK economy in a ‘whole of state’ assault, and that the UK’s response is ‘completely inadequate’.

I myself have been no stranger to Beijing’s bullying and intimidation tactics. Ever since I was denied entry to Hong Kong in 2017 and co-founded Hong Kong Watch later that year, I have received dozens of anonymous, threatening letters sent to my home. Some of my neighbours have also been contacted, urging them to monitor my movements. My mother, who lives in a different part of the country, has received letters asking her to tell her son to ‘shut up’.  

I believe I was removed from the Conservative party candidates list on the direct interference of the Chinese embassy in London in 2017. I had been on the approved parliamentary candidates list for many years, stood as a candidate in Durham in 2005, and had been invited to reapply for the list after the general election in 2017. A week after being denied entry to Hong Kong I was informed by party headquarters that I was no longer on the list. The explanations they gave made little sense to me, and I subsequently learned months later from sources in the party’s headquarters that the  Chinese ambassador Liu Xiaoming placed a call to the party about me in 2017.  

In 2018 I was the target of verbal abuse at the Conservative party conference by a Chinese state TV reporter. And in 2022 I was threatened by the Hong Kong authorities with a prison sentence for violating Hong Kong’s National Security Law through my activities in London. Yet I never imagined I may need to be on my guard talking to British parliamentary staff. 

The government and parliament clearly must act to improve security to counter the threat from foreign influence. The intelligence agencies should be applauded for exposing the allegations against the individuals in this case, and we can only trust now that the law will take its course. But lessons must be learned as well.

There is no magic bullet when it comes to foreign infiltration. Not everyone who advocates for engagement with China or for greater nuance in our China policy is an agent of Beijing. There is room for debate and difference over the question of our relationship with China – there must be in a democracy. Most importantly, we must be careful not to veer into anti-Chinese racism, which would be wrong and would play into Beijing’s narrative that critics of the CCP regime are anti-China. We must also avoid prejudicing or penalising exiled diaspora communities who have fled the CCP. Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs and Chinese dissidents must continue to be warmly welcomed in parliament. If the allegations made against this British individual are true, they show that the battle with the CCP is not a matter of race but of values, and that the CCP is prepared to use any means and any person to pursue its interests.  

But there are clear steps we must take. 

Parliamentary staff recruited to work with particularly sensitive committees or groups – where they may have access to classified information or the ability to influence MPs – should be subjected to more stringent background vetting. Due diligence and thorough background checks should be conducted to spot red flags earlier. 

In recent decades, parliamentary security has largely been trained to focus on the terrorism threat, whether from the IRA or radical Islamist jihadists. It is time for security to be reviewed and adapted to be able to spot state-based threats as well, whether they are from China, Russia or elsewhere. 

The relationship between All Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) and foreign embassies should also be reviewed. Many APPGs do a good job promoting our relations with countries around the world or advocating for human rights in places where there is repression or conflict. But some – such as the APPG on China – have in the past been too close to the embassies of what we ought now to recognise as hostile states. 

Lastly, the government should work more closely with the China-watching community, listen to human rights advocates, security experts and the diaspora, and provide more funding as well as safeguards for initiatives to counter Beijing’s propaganda.  

In the current system, there is huge pressure on MPs to rely on their own individual judgment when hiring staff. More support from the security authorities in doing due diligence, especially for appointments to key staff positions with access to information and influence that is of value to hostile states, is vital if we are to safeguard our democracy and counter the threats to our freedoms. 

This article was published on The Spectator on 12 September 2023.