Explainer: New United Front Work Regulations push deeper assimilation of Hong Kong identity and institutions into the mainland

On the 5th January, 2021, a revised version of the Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front work came into force. The Regulations are an amendment to an earlier 2015 version of the regulations, and were published on Xinhua, China’s state news agency.

The United Front Work Department (中共中央统一战线工作部) is a department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charged with influencing, managing relations with and gathering intelligence on key people and organisations both inside and outside mainland China. Its role is to “unite hearts” and “gathering forces”. As the document declares:

“It is an important magic weapon to win the revolution… to strengthen the party's class foundation, expand the party's popular foundation, and consolidate the party's ruling position. The magic weapon is an important magic weapon for comprehensively building a modern socialist country and realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

The regulations apply not only to ‘compatriots’ in China but those in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as well as among the Chinese diaspora abroad, with specific reference made to non-party affiliated “intellectuals” and overseas Chinese students.

Under the new regulations there are notable changes to united front work in Hong Kong, with specific focus now given not only to “national awareness and patriotism”, but also for developing and strengthening a “patriotic love of Hong Kong”. This is a challenge to an indigenous Hong Kong identity that is separate from national and party patriotism. It redefines what it means to identify with, belong to and love Hong Kong. Love of Hong Kong, in the United Front's eyes, must involve love of the People's Republic of China and the CCP. United Front actors now have a duty to force this interpretation on Hong Kongers. This is bound to lead to further tensions.

The new regulations also stress the integration of Hong Kong and Macau into Mainland China, in terms of security, economic development and the national project, with the goals being stability and long-term prosperity. Hong Kong is also to “fully and accurately implement the principles of ‘one country, two systems’”, and must “adhere to and improve” the system. Members of democratic parties and non-affiliated people are to be supported to be part of the United Front.

Whilst this does leave open the possibility of the system evolving, the language is consistent with that used to present a lessening of freedoms. Political reform remains possible, but will come only if control and stability are assured. Any progress will be democratic representation as defined by the CCP's “correct” understanding of the concept. This will undoubtedly differ from the understanding laid out in international law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

It is often overlooked that a more complete Chinese translation of the United Front is that it is a “battlefront”. Whilst it is easy to see the term as a relic of the Cold War, presumptions that were reasonable a few years ago are harder to accept today. Context matters. The language with which these regulations are often promulgated among the Chinese community has become increasingly militaristic, and framed within the context of an ideological war. It is not unknown for departments to change names to better reflect the times. Yet China choose to continue this language, and under President Xi the department has been significantly reinvigorated.

This guest blog was written by Evan Fowler. Evan Fowler is an independent writer and researcher focusing on Hong Kong and China. He is an Associate Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society